Many have called for algorithmic accountability: laws governing decision-making by complex algorithms, or artificial intelligence (AI). The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) now establishes exactly this. The recent debate over the "right to explanation" (a right to information about individual decisions made by algorithms) has obscured the significant algorithmic accountability regime established by the GDPR. The GDPR's provisions on algorithmic accountability, which include a right to explanation, have the potential to be broader, stronger, and deeper than the requirements of the preceding Data Protection Directive. This Article clarifies, including for a U.S. audience, what the GDPR requires.
the United States has been largely speculative, operating in a policy vacuum. 4 This is resolutely not, however, the case in the European Union.
On May 25, 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) went into effect in the EU. 5 The GDPR contains a significant set of rules on algorithmic accountability, imposing transparency, process, and oversight on the use of computer algorithms to make significant decisions about human beings. 6 The GDPR may prove to be an example, both good and bad, of a robust algorithmic accountability regime in practice. 7 However, to a U.S. audience, the recent vigorous debate around whether there is a "right to explanation" in the GDPR may inspire confusion. 8 Arguments over the In 2016, to the surprise of some EU data protection lawyers, and to considerable global attention, Goodman and Flaxman asserted in a short paper that the GDPR contained a "right to an explanation" of algorithmic decision making. As Wachter et al. have comprehensively pointed out, the truth is not quite that simple. This Article clarifies, including for a U.S. audience, what is and is not required by the GDPR. It contributes to the existing conversation over algorithmic accountability in the GDPR by addressing the authoritative guidelines on automated decision-making. 9 Contrary to several scholars, I understand the GDPR to create a broader, stronger, and deeper algorithmic accountability regime than what existed under the EU's Data Protection Directive (DPD). 10 The debate over the right to explanation threatens to obscure this significant development.
Part II of this Article begins by explaining for a U.S. audience the status of the various interpretative documents that accompany the GDPR. Part III identifies the provisions of the GDPR that apply to algorithmic accountability, and points to textual ambiguities that gave rise to disagreements over the right to explanation. Part IV uses the interpretative documents introduced in Part II, including recent authoritative guidelines, to show how many of the questions left open in the GDPR's text have been subsequently narrowed or resolved. Part V turns to the right to explanation and other transparency mechanisms. Throughout, this Article focuses on the GDPR's requirements for private companies rather than for governments.
II. GDPR BASICS
First, a U.S. audience needs to understand the legal materials at play. The GDPR consists of both text (Articles) and an extensive explanatory preamble. The preambular provisions, known as Recitals, do not have the direct force of law in the EU.
11 A Recital is supposed to "cast light on the interpretation to be 13. See, e.g., Brkan, supra note 8, at 16 ("Dismissing the possibility of the existence of the right to explanation altogether because recitals are not legally binding is too formalistic.").
14. Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 50 ("In the GDPR however, as a matter of political expediency, many issues too controversial for agreement in the main text have been kicked into the long grass of the recitals, throwing up problems of just how binding they are.").
15. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. companies will behave. A company, concerned about the GDPR's significant penalties (famously up to 4% of worldwide revenue) backed by an increasingly rights-protective European Court of Justice, is likely to follow both the Recitals and Working Party guidance because they are indicative of what the GDPR's enforcers are likely to do. 17 Although these texts are not technically binding, they strongly indicate how enforcers and eventually courts will likely interpret the text.
In another Article, I argue at length that this is precisely how the GDPR is intended to work. 18 The GDPR is, in large part, a collaborative governance regime. 19 The text is full of broad standards, to be given specific substance over time through ongoing dialogues between regulators and companies, backed eventually by courts. Both the Recitals and the Working Party guidelines, along with numerous mechanisms ranging from a formal process for establishing codes of conduct to less formal impact assessment requirements, are part of this collaborative approach. 20 Thus, when scholars argue that what is in the Recitals is not the law, 21 they are not only insisting on a technicality-distinguishing between harder and softer legal instruments-they are also disregarding the fundamentally collaborative, evolving nature of the GDPR, and removing important sources of clarity for companies as the law develops.
17. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 84. For indicators of the Court's increasing interest in data protection, see, for example, Joint Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc'ns, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (2014) (finding data retention requirements to violate the fundamental right to data protection); Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (2014) (finding that Google as a search engine is a data controller and thus is responsible for affording individuals the data protection right to erasure ("right to be forgotten") from search engine indexing). While the ECtHR is not responsible for GDPR interpretation, it also forms a backstop to surveillancerelated law in the EU. 
III. ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TEXT OF THE GDPR
This Part introduces the text of the GDPR that applies to algorithmic decision-making. There are four Articles of the GDPR that specifically address algorithmic decision-making. Article 22 of the GDPR addresses "[a]utomated individual decision-making, including profiling." 22 Articles 13, 14, and 15 each contain transparency rights around automated decision-making and profiling. 23 More general GDPR provisions, such as the right to object, the right to rectification (correction), data protection by design and by default, and the requirement of data protection impact assessments, likely apply to most or even all algorithmic decision-making. 24 For the sake of brevity and clarity, this Part discusses only the text of Articles 22, 13, 14, and 15, which specifically reference automated decision-making. 25 As others have pointed out, however, the more generally applicable provisions of the GDPR also play an important role in governing algorithmic decision-making. 27 Scholars have pointed out, based on the historical treatment of similar text in the Data Protection Directive (DPD), the predecessor to the GDPR, that this could be interpreted as either a right to object to such decisions or a general prohibition on significant algorithmic decision-making. 28 Interpreting Article 22 as establishing a right to object would make the right narrower. In practice, it would allow companies to regularly use algorithms in significant decisionmaking, adjusting their behavior only if individuals invoke their rights. 22 . GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22. 23. See id. at arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h). 24. See Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 19 (noting "other parts of the GDPR related (i) to the right to erasure ('right to be forgotten') and the right to data portability; and (ii) to privacy by design, Data Protection Impact Assessments and certification and privacy seals"), 23, 77; Casey et. al, supra note 8, at 173-76 (discussing DPIA safeguards); GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 29 (discussing DPIA and data protection officer), 34 (discussing right to object); see also GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 91 (described as "[n]ecessity of a data protection impact assessment").
25. See generally GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. Interpreting Article 22 instead as a prohibition on algorithmic decision-making would require all companies using algorithmic decision-making to assess which exception they fall under and to implement safeguards to protect individual rights, or to not deploy algorithmic decision-making at all.
The Article 22 right/prohibition applies only when the decision is "based solely" on algorithmic decision-making, and it applies only when the decision produces "legal effects" or "similarly significant" effects on the individual. 29 What either of these restrictions means is unclear from the GDPR's text alone. One could narrowly interpret "based solely" to mean that any human involvement, even rubber-stamping, takes an algorithmic decision out of Article 22's scope; or one could take a broader reading to cover all algorithmically-based decisions that occur without meaningful human involvement. 30 Similarly, one could take a narrow reading of "similarly significant" effects to leave out, for example, behavioral advertising and price discrimination, or one could take a broader reading and include behavioral inferences and their use. There are three exceptions to the Article 22 right/prohibition. The first is when the automated decision is "necessary for . . . a contract." 32 The second is when a Member State of the European Union has passed a law creating an exception. 33 The third is when an individual has explicitly consented to algorithmic decision-making. 34 Both the contractual exception and the explicit consent exception could be interpreted to be broader or narrower in nature, 29 . GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22(1) ("The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.").
30. See, e.g., Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 11 ("Even if a decision is formally ascribed to a person, it is to be regarded as based solely on automated processing if a person does not actively assess the result of the processing prior to its formalization as a decision. In the case of sensitive, or "special category," data, even fewer exceptions apply.
36
Even when an exception to Article 22 applies, a company must implement "suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests . . . ." 37 This requirement is the source of the debate over the right to explanation. Suitable safeguards, according to the text, must include "at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision." 38 This explicitly creates a version of algorithmic due process: a right to an opportunity to be heard. 39 These are the only safeguards named in the GDPR's text. The use of the words "at least," however, indicates that these are an open list of minimum requirements, and a company should do more. As discussed in Part IV, both the preamble (Recital) and interpretative guidance have added to this list of both suggested and required safeguards, and both include as a safeguard a right to explanation of an individual decision.
One important note on suitable safeguards: the specific minimum examples above apply with respect to the contractual exception and explicit consent exception, but are not in the text of the Member State law exception. 40 This textual difference leaves room for the possibility that Member States might enact a different set of suitable safeguards. 41 It remains to be seen whether Data Protection Authorities and courts will allow Member States to adopt significantly different protections against algorithmic decision-making. 36. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22(4) ("Decisions referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be based on special categories of personal data referred to in Article 9(1), unless point (a) or (g) of Article 9(2) applies . . . .").
37. GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 22(2)(b), 22(3). 38. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. Outside of Article 22, the GDPR contains a series of individual notification and access rights specific to automated decision-making. Article 13 establishes a series of notification rights/requirements when information is collected directly from individuals.
42 Article 14 establishes a similar set of notification rights/requirements when information about individuals is collected from third parties. 43 Article 15 creates an individual right of access to information held by a company that can be invoked "at reasonable intervals." 44 All three Articles contain an identical provision requiring disclosure of "the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling." 45 Additionally, this provision requires disclosure of "meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject." 46 This language has provoked debate, especially over the question of timing. 47 The language in all three Articles is identical, but the temporal context is different. Articles 13 and 14, roughly speaking, require companies to notify individuals when data is obtained, 48 while Article 15 creates access rights at almost any time. Some scholars have argued that because the text of the three Articles is identical, it must refer to the same information, which indicates that "meaningful information about the logic involved" can be only a broad 42 . GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 13. 43. Id. at art. 14. 44. Id. at art. 15. See GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 63 (described as "[r]ight of access"). 45. GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h) (collectively, "meaningful information" provisions) (emphasis added).
46. GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h). 48. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 13 (requiring it when data is obtained); id. at art. 14(3)(a) (requiring disclosure "within a reasonable period after obtaining the personal data, but at the latest within one month, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the personal data are processed"). Article 14 also envisions notification in communication with a data subject where data is used for communication (art. 14(3)(b)) or upon disclosure of data to another third party (art. 14(3)(c)). These both refer to a later notification than upon obtaining data, but it is harder to envision when this might refer to algorithmic decision-making that has already occurred (unless one is communicating the results to an individual or third party, perhaps?).
overview of a decision-making system. 49 Others argue, however, that, read in context, "meaningful information" must mean multiple things. 50 Articles 13 and 14 might require an overview of a system prior to processing, but Article 15's access right could provide deeper disclosure, including insight into a particular decision affecting a particular individual. The text of the GDPR does not clarify this conflict one way or another.
There are exceptions to the GDPR's notification and access requirements. 51 While not included in the text of the GDPR, an accompanying Recital mentions an exception for intellectual property rights-that is, trade secrets and copyright law. 52 Some scholars argue that, in practice, trade secrets, in particular, represent a significant obstacle to meaningful disclosure of algorithms. 53 This has certainly been the case in the United States. 54 Others observe, however, that fundamental rights such as the right to data protection take precedence over trade secrecy. 55 The text of the GDPR thus creates both transparency and process rights around algorithmic decision-making. The text itself, however, leaves considerable room for interpretation. But both accompanying and subsequent interpretative documents narrow and clarify the GDPR's text, resolving a number of the conflicts discussed above. 
IV. ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GDPR, INTERPRETED
Both the Recitals and recently adopted Working Party guidelines clarify the GDPR's text in important ways. Article 22 and the "meaningful information" provisions are not devoid of substance; they create an algorithmic accountability regime that is broader, stronger, and deeper than what existed in Europe prior to the GDPR. 56 This Part first explains how the GDPR's text has been clarified, with reference to the debates discussed in Part III above. 57 It then explains why the GDPR's version of algorithmic accountability is broader, stronger, and deeper than Article 15 of the DPD.
First, the Working Party guidelines clarify that Article 22 is a prohibition on algorithmic decision-making, not a mere right to object to it.
58 This is significant because it clarifies that companies have a duty not to use solely automated decision-making, rather than a mere duty to respond to individuals who object to it. Companies using algorithmic decision-making will, therefore, have to assess which exception they fall under (contract, explicit consent, or Member State law), which will often trigger additional disclosures to individuals as companies attempt to obtain explicit consent or to justify why such decision-making is necessary to a contract. 59 Second, the guidelines explain that for an automated decision to fall outside of Article 22, human involvement must be meaningful. 60 A company does not escape Article 22 solely by having a human rubber-stamp algorithmic decisions. 61 Human oversight must be "carried out by someone who has the authority and competence to change the decision."
62 That person must additionally have access to information beyond just the algorithm's outputs. 63 The GDPR will thus have the effect of requiring companies to think about 56. See GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h). 57. For another (more pessimistic) take on the guidelines, see Veale & Edwards, supra note 9.
58. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 19. 59. Id. at 13 ("Controllers seeking to rely upon consent as a basis for profiling will need to show that data subjects understand exactly what they are consenting to . . . .").
60. Id. at 21 ("The controller cannot avoid the Article 22 provisions by fabricating human involvement [, and] must ensure that any oversight of the decision is meaningful, rather than just a token gesture.").
61. Id. ("[I]f someone routinely applies automatically generated profiles to individuals without any actual influence on the result, this would still be a decision based solely on automated processing.").
62. Id.
See id.
(noting that the controller "should consider all the relevant data" during analysis of the decision).
how they structure their "human in the loop" of algorithmic decision-making to escape Article 22's prohibition or forego its safeguard requirements. 64 Third, both Recital 71 and the guidelines provide examples of decisions with significant effects. Recital 71 provides examples of credit determinations and e-recruiting practices. 65 The Working Party guidelines explain that "only serious impactful effects" will trigger Article 22. 66 The guidelines provide both a framework for determining what constitutes a significant effect 67 and a list of examples: decisions that affect financial circumstances or access to health services or access to education, or decisions that deny employment or put someone "at a serious disadvantage."
68
The guidelines additionally, and perhaps surprisingly, explain that some behavioral advertising will be covered. 69 Particularly intrusive advertising targeted at particularly vulnerable data subjects in particularly manipulative ways will trigger Article 22. 
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at least some behavioral advertising and some differential pricing tactics. This coverage is broader than some scholars predicted.
72
Fourth, the Working Party guidelines somewhat close the trade secrets loophole to algorithmic transparency. Several scholars feared that in practice, companies could avoid the GDPR's transparency requirements by citing a need for corporate secrecy. 73 The guidelines explain, however, that while there is "some protection" against having to reveal trade secrets, companies "cannot rely on the protection of their trade secrets as an excuse to deny access or refuse to provide information . . . ."
74 While this does not eliminate the trade secrets exception discussed in Recital 63, it does at least urge data protection authorities to watch for the use of overly broad trade secrets claims.
Fifth, the guidelines clarify that both the contractual exception and the explicit consent exception to Article 22 are relatively narrow. 75 For example, online retailers cannot argue that profiling is necessary for an online purchase, even where profiling is mentioned in the fine print of the contract.
76
Automated decision-making might be necessary where human involvement is impossible due to the sheer quantity of information processed, but then the company must show that there is no other effective and less privacy-intrusive way to accomplish the same goal.
77
The guidelines similarly constrain the explicit consent exception and turn it into an information-driving tool. 78 They explain that individuals must be provided enough information about the use and consequences of profiling to ensure that any consent "represents an informed choice." 79 The guidelines do not provide additional information about "explicit consent," except to note that while explicit consent is not defined in the GDPR, a "high level of individual control over personal data is . Finally, the guidelines address the central question of what is required as "appropriate safeguards" to protect individuals from automated decisionmaking when one of the exceptions applies. 81 Scholars have argued that there is no right to an explanation of individual decisions in the GDPR because that right is not specifically enumerated in the GDPR's text. 82 That reasoning is wrong. 83 Recital 71 states that "suitable safeguards . . . should include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision." 84 The Working Party guidelines directly quote this language, not once but thrice. 85 The guidelines counsel that there is a need for this form of transparency because an individual can challenge a particular decision or express her view only if she actually understands "how it has been made and on what basis." 86 In other words, an individual has a right to explanation of an individual decision because that explanation is necessary for her to invoke the other rights-e.g., to contest a decision, to express her view-that are explicitly enumerated in the text of the GDPR. 87 Beyond the right to explanation, the guidelines explain that the GDPR establishes a version of individual algorithmic due process by creating an 83. At this point, the bulk of the literature on the right to explanation appears to agree that this reasoning is erroneous. See Brkan, supra note 8, at 16 ("Dismissing the possibility of the existence of the right to explanation altogether because recitals are not legally binding is too formalistic, in particular in the light of the CoJ's case law which regularly uses recitals as an interpretative aid."); Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 8, at 255 ("[T]he right to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after the assessment should always be exercisable."); Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 16 ("[W]e should not discount the possibility that a right of ex post explanation of automated decisions is implicit in the right 'to contest' a decision pursuant to Art. 22(3)."); Selbst & Powles, supra note 8, at 235 ("Recital 71 is not meaningless, and has a clear role in assisting interpretation and co-determining positive law."), 242 ("We believe that the right to explanation should be interpreted functionally, flexibly, and should, at a minimum, enable a data subject to exercise his or her rights under the GDPR and human rights law.").
84. GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 71 (emphasis added opportunity to be heard. 88 The guidelines note that safeguards must include human intervention by a reviewer with "the appropriate authority and capability to change the decision," and who should have access to "all the relevant data." 89 This imposes another form of transparency, albeit internal to a company, as technical information flows to the human called on to intervene in an algorithmic decision. There is little in the guidelines, however, outlining how human intervention and contestation should take place, apart from suggesting that companies provide a link to an appeals process, a timeline for review, and a named contact person for inquiries. 90 This opportunity to be heard thus may prove to be more or less meaningful, in practice, and risks being, as currently described, reduced to the provision of a contact email.
The next interpretative move that the guidelines make might not be intuitive to a U.S. audience expecting a system entirely focused on individual rights. Beyond individual due process, the guidelines interpret "suitable safeguards" to also include systemic accountability measures such as auditing and ethical review boards. 91 These systemic accountability measures have dual meaning: They can be understood as bolstering individual rights by ensuring that somebody impartial is providing oversight in the name of individuals, or as providing necessary accountability over company behavior in a collaborative governance (private/public partnership) regime, as companies come up with and implement systems for preventing error, bias, and discrimination. 92 In practice, this systemic accountability involves a number of system-wide checks. Scholars have read Recital 71's language to require algorithmic auditing. 93 The Working Party Guidelines support this interpretation, suggesting that safeguards include quality assurance checks, algorithmic auditing, independent third-party auditing, and more. 94 Both Recital 71 and the guidelines also task companies with preventing discrimination in many forms, including on the basis of race, ethnic origin, political opinion, religion. 95 The guidelines envision ongoing testing and feedback into an algorithmic decisionmaking system to prevent errors, inaccuracies, and discrimination on the basis of sensitive ("special category") data. 96 As for whether Member States are bound to create laws incorporating these same safeguards-that is, whether the GDPR harmonizes safeguards against algorithmic decision-making or leaves space for Member State variations-the guidelines are strongly suggestive but not entirely clear. To return to the larger claim: while the guidelines and Recitals do not eliminate all room for interpretation, they largely clarify the GDPR's algorithmic accountability provisions to make them more, not less, rigorous. These interpretive documents fully close a number of the loopholes suggested by scholars and limit room for others. This causes Article 22 (and accompanying notification and access rights) to be broader, stronger, and deeper than the preceding EU algorithmic accountability regime. 100 The GDPR applies to more activity (is broader), comes with more significant 95. See id. at 6, 10, 14 (explaining that even in profiling without automated decisionmaking, companies should employ "safeguards aimed at ensuring fairness, non-discrimination and accuracy in the profiling process"); see also GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 71 ("[P]revent, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation, or processing that results in measures having such an effect.").
96 enforcement (is stronger), and adds significant protections (is deeper), compared to the Data Protection Directive.
Article 22 applies to or restricts more activity, and is, therefore, broader than Article 15 of the Data Protection Directive. Where the DPD's provisions were limited to automated decision-making connected to individual profiling-that is, processing for the purpose of "evaluat[ing] certain personal aspects" of the person-Article 22 is not limited to profiling. 101 Automated decision-making may often "partially overlap with or result from profiling[,]" 102 but the guidelines make clear that Article 22's scope goes beyond personal profiling to other kinds of automated decisions. 103 Article 22 is also broader by virtue of being interpreted to apply to decisions involving human rubber-stamping, where several Member States had interpreted the Directive's provisions to apply only to automated decisions involving no human at all. 104 Similarly, where some Member States implemented the DPD's provisions as a right to object, the Working Party guidelines explain that Article 22 is a prohibition on algorithmic decisionmaking. 105 It thus applies to all automated decision-making, not just when an individual voices an objection. Thus several of the interpretations advanced by the Working Party ensure that Article 22 will apply to more activity than the DPD did.
Second, Article 22 is stronger than the Directive's provisions, meaning that it is harder law. 106 The GDPR provides both stronger penalties and stronger enforcement mechanisms. 107 And where Member States could change the wording and in practice the meaning of the DPD through implementation, the GDPR, as a regulation, has direct effect within Member States. Thus, the wiggle room in Article 22 is lessened (even as the text still contemplates some variations by Member States) and the enforcement authority behind it is greatly strengthened. Finally, Article 22's protections run deeper than the DPD's provisions. Specifically, the mandatory requirements for companies are more significant under the GDPR than they were under the DPD. Under the DPD, if the contract exception applied, it was not clear that a company needed to do anything else to protect individual rights-it need not necessarily adopt safeguards.
108 By contrast, Article 22 requires safeguards-even when an exception applies-that, at a minimum, include a right to human intervention, a right to object, and a right to express one's view. 109 As discussed above, the Working Party guidelines and Recitals clarify that these measures include both an individual right to explanation and multiple systemic accountability requirements such as audits.
Article 22 and the accompanying notification and access provisions in Articles 13, 14, and 15 thus put in place an algorithmic accountability regime that is broader, stronger, and deeper than the largely symbolic regime that existed under the DPD. Accompanied by other company duties in the GDPR-including establishing data protection officers, using data protection impact assessments, and following the principles of data protection by design-this regime, if enforced, has the potential to be a sea change in how algorithmic decision-making is regulated in the EU. 
V. THE RIGHT TO EXPLANATION, REVISITED
Against this backdrop of the GDPR's strengthened algorithmic accountability regime, this Article now returns to the much-debated right to explanation. Transparency is a basic principle of the GDPR. 111 In fact, it can be striking to a U.S. audience just how many of the GDPR's rights resemble open government laws, rather than traditional privacy causes of action.
112 This is because data protection regimes are grounded in fairness, and transparency and fairness are linked ideals; we often use transparency as an element of accountability, to establish that systems are fair.
113 But in the right to explanation debate, the centrality of transparency to the GDPR has gotten lost. Several scholars have, pessimistically, vastly underrepresented what kinds of disclosures about algorithmic decision-making are required under the GDPR. 114 To be fair, these scholars largely wrote before the Working Party guidelines were finalized. But now that the final version of the guidelines has been released, some explanation of explanation is overdue.
To understand what is at stake, it is worth briefly summarizing the backand-forth over transparency that has taken place in the literature. Scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have called for transparency in algorithmic decisionmaking, in the form of both notice towards individuals and audits that enable expert third-party oversight.
115 Some of these calls for transparency have been 111. See GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 5(1)(a); GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 9 ("Transparency of processing is a fundamental requirement of the GDPR.").
112. Compare, e.g., GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 12-15, with the U.S. Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (comparing the GDPR's rights of transparency, notification, and access to the U.S. Privacy Act, which provides individual rights of transparency into public systems of records).
Compare, e.g., the GDPRs implementation of the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPS), with the Prosser privacy torts. For an overview of the FIPS, see GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 5. See also GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 39. 115. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 1, at 1305; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 1; Hildebrandt, supra note 1; Kim, supra note 1; FRANK PASQUALE, THE ambitiously deep and broad, suggesting that both algorithmic source code and data sets should be subjected to public scrutiny. 116 Others have responded by enumerating the harms this level of transparency could cause, 117 or by arguing that transparency directed at individuals will be relatively useless since individuals lack the expertise to do much with it.
118 But transparency of some kind has a clear place in algorithmic accountability governance, from recent calls for algorithmic impact assessments to proposals for whistleblower protections, to regularly repeated calls for algorithmic auditing.
119
The GDPR comes closest to creating what Frank Pasquale has called "qualified transparency": a system of targeted revelations of different degrees of depth and scope aimed at different recipients.
120 Transparency in practice is not limited to revelations to the public. 121 It includes putting in place internal company oversight, oversight by regulators, oversight by third parties, and BLACK BOX SOCIETY 140-88 (2015) (calling this "qualified transparency"-"limiting revelations in order to respect all the interests involved in a given piece of information").
116. Citron supra note 1, at 1308; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 20, 26 (the "logics of predictive scoring systems should be open to public inspection"). Citron & Pasquale also note that information about the datasets (but not the datasets themselves) could be released to the public. Id. at 27 (noting that Zarsky says the public could be informed about datasets without social risk); Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1563. 120. PASQUALE, supra note 115, at 142. 121. See Zarksy, supra note 1, at 1532 ("Intuitively, transparency is linked to merely one meaning-that the relevant information is disseminated broadly to (1) the general public" but "[f]ully understanding this concept, however, calls for distinguishing among the recipients of the information transparency policy provides."). But see Kroll et al., supra note 1, which appears to define transparency only as disclosure to the public. communications to affected individuals. Each of these revelations may be of a different depth or kind; an oversight board might get access to the source code, while an individual instead might get clearly communicated summaries that she can understand.
To summarize the right to explanation and accompanying transparency measures, as some have, as a "transparency fallacy"-palliative measures requiring mere icons or simplistic explanations-is to both misrepresent their actual substance and mischaracterize the GDPR's overall transparency regime.
122 The GDPR's individual transparency provisions are deeper than some have suggested. And the overall accountability regime that the GDPR puts in place establishes multiple layers of transparency, some of which go very deep indeed. This Part starts with individual transparency rights, before turning to the systemic approach to algorithmic accountability that the GDPR puts in place.
Individuals have a "right to be informed" about algorithmic decisionmaking. 123 That right is housed both in the "meaningful information about the logic involved" provisions of Articles 13 and 14 and in Article 22(3)'s suitable safeguards provision. 124 It is true that the guidelines state that individuals need not be provided with source code or complex mathematical explanations, under either Article 22 or the accompanying notification and access provisions. 125 But that is because those individual transparency provisions are meant to serve the purpose of providing expert oversight.
The "who" and "why" of transparency in the GDPR dictates the what, when, and how. Individual transparency provisions, as the guidelines make clear, are intended to empower individuals to invoke their other rights under the GDPR.
126 Therefore, while individuals need not be provided with source code, they should be given far more than a one-sentence overview of how an algorithmic decision-making system works. They need to be given enough information to be able to understand what they are agreeing to (if a company 125. Id. at 25 ("[N]ot necessarily a complex explanation of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm."), 31 ("Instead of providing a complex mathematical explanation about how algorithms or machine-learning work, the controller should consider using clear and comprehensive ways to deliver the information to the data subject.").
126. Id. at 27 ("The controller should provide the data subject with general information . . . which is also useful for him or her to challenge the decision . . . . The data subject will only be able to challenge a decision or express their view if they fully understand how it has been made and on what basis.").
is relying on the explicit consent exception); 127 to contest a decision; 128 and to find and correct erroneous information, including inferences.
129
Scholars have (in this Article's view, disingenuously) suggested that the GDPR's transparency requirements in Article 12-requirements that companies make an effort to communicate information in a way understandable to individuals-restrict the depth and quality of information a company must reveal. 130 Article 12 demands that companies communicate clearly, to ensure that individuals can in fact act on the information they receive. It aims to prevent companies from flooding individuals with useless or unnecessarily complicated or time-wasting information, abusing notice requirements to create obscurity through information floods. 131 In other words, Article 12 requires that companies make their communications to individuals comprehensible. It does not reduce the GDPR's substantial disclosure requirements to meaninglessly high-level or simplistic information 127. Id. at 13 ("Controllers seeking to rely upon consent as a basis for profiling will need to show that data subjects understand exactly what they are consenting to.").
128. Id. at 27. 129. Id. at 17-18 ("Individuals may wish to challenge the accuracy of the data used and any grouping or category that has been applied to them. This rights to rectification and erasure apply to both the 'input personal data' (the personal data used to create a profile), and the 'output data' (the profile itself or 'score' assigned to the person)."), 31 ("Controllers providing data subjects with access to their profile in connection with their Article 15 rights should allow them the opportunity to update or amend any inaccuracies in the data or profile.").
130. See Wachter et. al, Counterfactual, supra note 8, at 865 ("Detailed information appears to not be necessary as Art. 12(7) states that the required information can be provided along with standardi[z]ed icons . . . proposed icons reveal the initial expectations of regulators for simple, easily understood information."), 866 ("[E]ach provision suggests that information disclosures need to be tailored to their audience, with envisioned audiences including children and uneducated laypeople."), 887 (illustrating simplistic transparency infographics that were ultimately not adopted by the European Parliament, and stating that these "reveal the level of complexity expected by EU legislators" in an explanation to a data subject and that "[t]he reliance on generic icons suggests that individual-level, contextualised information is not required").
131. See Ananny & Crawford, supra note 1, at 979 ("[S]trategic opacity-in which actors 'bound by transparency regulations' purposefully make so much information 'visible that unimportant pieces of information will take so much time and effort to sift through that receivers will be distracted from the central information the actor wishes to conceal.' "); Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1508 ("The process of merely flooding the public with facts and figures does not effectively promote transparency. It might even backfire."); see also Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1324-25 (2010); GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 31 ("Instead of providing a complex mathematical explanation . . . the controller should consider using clear and comprehensive ways to deliver the information to the data subject.").
or infographics. Companies can be required to communicate in-depth information at the same time that they are required to communicate it clearly. 132 Communication to individuals about algorithmic decision-making must thus be simultaneously understandable (or "legible"), 133 meaningful, and actionable. It must be understandable to individuals, rather than delivered in complex jargon or as an information flood. 134 However, it must also convey considerable depth; the guidelines note that "[c]omplexity is no excuse for failing to provide information." 135 And it must provide enough information that an individual can act on it-to contest a decision, or to correct inaccuracies, or to request erasure. 136 Thus, there is a clear relationship between the other individual rights the GDPR establishes-contestation, correction, and erasure-and the kind of individualized transparency it requires. This suggests something interesting about transparency: the substance of other underlying legal rights often determines transparency's substance. 137 If one has a right of correction, one needs to see errors. If one has a right against discrimination, one needs to see what factors are used in a decision. Otherwise, information asymmetries render underlying rights effectively void.
The guidelines list examples of what kinds of information should be provided to individuals and how it should be provided. Individuals should be told both the categories of data used in an algorithmic decision-making process and an explanation of why these categories are considered relevant. 138 Moreover, they should be told the "factors taken into account for the decisionmaking process, and . . . their respective 'weight' on an aggregate level . . . ."
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They should be told how a profile used in algorithmic decision-making is built, "including any statistics used in the analysis [,] " 140 and the sources of the data in the profile. 141 Lastly, companies should provide individuals an explanation of why a profile is relevant to the decision-making process and how it is used for a decision.
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The GDPR's individualized system of algorithmic transparency thus requires far more than a counterfactual explanation (e.g., "if you were not 25, you would have gotten this job"). 143 The guidelines further note, in several places, that companies should use technological design to create more effective notice mechanisms, such as through "visuali[z]ation and interactive techniques."
144 Not only is it a company's duty to communicate a particular depth of information, but a company must also pay attention to using effective design choices to ensure that information is both noticed and understood.
This does not mean that the individual right to explanation and the accompanying transparency rights in the GDPR give individuals a right to all information about an algorithm. Nor does it mean to suggest that the conversation about what information must be released to individuals ends here. It is clear from the guidelines that this conversation will be ongoing. There is still room to read in, for example, a best practice of releasing performance metrics, which the guidelines do not suggest. 145 Two scholars have proposed a number of suggestions of the kind of information that would be useful-including both information about the model (the family of model, training parameters, summary input data, human-understandable averages of how inputs become outputs, how the model was tested, trained, or screened) and information about the individual decision (counterfactuals, which cases are most similar to the individual's, what characteristics cause individuals to receive similar treatment, how confident the system is of a specific outcome). 146 But the GDPR's individual algorithmic transparency rights, accompanied by other GDPR transparency rights, go a long way towards establishing what U.S. scholars have called for-including revealing the sources of data, inferences about an individual, and even some math. 147 Throughout, the emphasis is on individual understanding of information of a meaningful depth, so that an individual subject of algorithmic decision-making can invoke her rights.
Other forms of systemic transparency that go substantially deeper accompany this individualized transparency regime. Individuals might not have access to source code or datasets, but other parties do. The GDPR's regime of systemic transparency is established through Article 22's safeguards provision and the Working Party interpretation of it, and through more general GDPR provisions such as the requirement of impact assessments. 148 This systemic transparency regime includes the requirement of data protection impact assessments for automated processing, the general information-forcing and oversight powers granted to regulatory authorities.
There are a number of ways that systematic transparency can be implemented. First, regulators can use significant information-forcing capabilities under the GDPR to get access to information about algorithms.
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The GDPR also envisions general data protection audits conducted by government authorities. 150 Second, most companies deploying algorithmic decision-making must set up internal accountability and disclosure regimes. They must perform a data protection impact assessment,151 and provide information to an internal but independent data protection officer who has, at least on paper, deep information-forcing abilities. 152 Companies that fall under Article 22 must also give human reviewers deeper transparency onto "all the relevant data" as part of the right to human intervention. 153 Third, the guidelines suggest that companies performing decision-making with a "high impact on individuals" should use independent third-party auditing and provide that auditor with "all necessary information about how the algorithm or machine learning system works." 154 Hence, the GDPR's approach to systemic accountability establishes a second aspect of Pasquale's "qualified transparency": deeper information flows, including source code, both within companies and to regulatory authorities and third-parties. It is true that this information does not get released to the public. But it is myopic to focus only on the individual version of transparency and decry its shallowness, rather than seeing its place and purpose in a system of required information flows.
The purpose of each transparency measure affects not just the depth of information revealed but also the timing of transparency. 155 Discrete events in the GDPR trigger individual transparency-when, for example, data is collected, 156 a decision is made, 157 an individual's consent is obtained, 158 or an individual requests information. 159 This connects individualized transparency to the rights of an individual, but limits the efficacy of individualized transparency at creating oversight over the construction of an algorithm, or its ongoing performance. In particular, individual transparency rights largely occur after the fact of algorithmic development, when it is far more difficult (if not impossible) to impose accountability or corrections on a system. 160 By contrast, the GDPR's systemic accountability measures are envisioned as ongoing, continuous, 161 and being implemented early on in an algorithm's development. This creates, in theory at least, internal, expert/third-party, and regulatory oversight over the development of an algorithm from its inception, better serving the purposes of correcting error, inaccuracy, and bias in a changing system over time.
VI. CONCLUSION
The GDPR sets up a system of "qualified transparency" over algorithmic decision-making that gives individuals one kind of information, and experts and regulators another. This multi-pronged approach to transparency should not be dismissed as lightly as some have done. There is an individual right to explanation. It is deeper than counterfactuals or a shallow and broad systemic overview, and it is coupled with other transparency measures that go towards providing both third-party and regulatory oversight over algorithmic decisionmaking. These transparency provisions are just one way in which the GDPR's system of algorithmic accountability is potentially broader, deeper, and stronger than the previous EU regime.
It is one thing to put these requirements on paper and quite another to have them operate in practice. The system of algorithmic accountability that the GDPR and its accompanying interpretative documents envision faces significant hurdles in implementation: high costs to both companies and regulators, limited individual access to justice, and limited technical capacity of both individuals and regulators. As I note elsewhere, there are other ways in which the GDPR may fail. 162 Its heavy reliance on collaborative governance in the absence of significant public or third-party oversight could lead to capture or underrepresentation of individual rights. 163 But for companies with a footprint in the EU, it is important to note that the GDPR does govern algorithmic decision-making, and many of the 161. See, e.g., GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 28
Controllers should introduce appropriate procedures and measures to prevent errors, inaccuracies or discrimination on the basis of special category data. These measures should be used on a cyclical basis; not only at the design stage, but also continuously, as the profiling is applied to individuals. potential loopholes in that system have been limited or closed. Companies face a decision of whether to put humans meaningfully back in the loop of algorithmic decision-making and thus escape Article 22. Otherwise, they must put in place a significant set of safeguards, including both individual rights and ongoing internal and third-party accountability measures.
